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Abstract 
This Memorandum presents the framework of a model which treats all elements 
of the Voyager 1973 Mission in sufficient detail to allow reasonable assurance 
that the Voyager policy on planetary quarantine can and will be adhered to by 
the Voyager Project. 
The Voyager 1973 Mission is esamined from the point of view of planetary 
quarantine in order to isolate every conceivable source. of contamination of the 
planet Mars. These sources are being studied in detail in order to ascertain . the requirements that must be met by the hardware and mission designs in order 
to satisfy the constraints imposed by the planetary quarantine policy. 
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The Voyager Planetary Quarantine Model 
1973 Mission 
1. Introduction 
This Memorandum consists of two parts. The first 
delineates the planetary quarantine policy and require- 
ments which have been established for the Voyager Proj- 
ect. The second part describes the framework of a 
mathematical model for assessing whether this policy can 
and/or will be adhered to. The format of the model 
can also be’ used to present the quarantine violation 
probability allocations which must be placed by the 
Voyager Planetary Quarantine Office. 
II. Planetary Quarantine Policy and 
Require men ts 
A. Establishment of Planetary Quarantine 
A fundamental scientific and philosophic question that 
has remained unanswerable until the advent of space 
flight is whether life exists anywhere in the universe 
other than on Earth. As a result of observations and 
study of the solar system, there is speculation that the 
only opportunity to investigate the existence and nature 
of extraterrestrial life within the solar system may be the 
planet Mars. If there is life on Mars, it is fundamental to 
the understanding of the nature and origin of 1,jfe 
whether that life is similar to the life on Earth or not. 
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The possibility of answering these vital questions would 
be seriously compromised if early interplanetary vehicles, 
such as Vogager, were to infect the planet Mars with 
any form of viable Earth life. In order to avoid such 
compromise, the planet Mars has been placed under 
quarantine. 
Any attempt to investigate Mars by means of inter- 
planetary ‘vehicles must have associated with it some 
finite probability of infecting Mars, thus violating the 
quarantine. Quarantine requirements, to be meaningful, 
should be so placed that there is a very low probability 
that Mars is infected prior to completion of an adequate 
spectrum of biological experiments. 
B. Planetary Quarantine Requirements 
Infection, contamination and quarantine definitions 
are established in the following. 
1. Znfection (of an extraterrestrial planet). Infection 
is defined as growth and spreading of terrestrial micro- 
organisms throughout major portions of the planet’s sur- 
face, subsurface, and/or atmosphere. The only kind of 
infection of concern from the planetary quarantine point 
of view is, of course, that which results from terrestrial 
exploration of space. 
1 
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2. Contamination (of nn extraterrestrial planet). Con- 
tamination is defined as release of one or more viable 
terrestrial microorganisms on the planctary surface, 
within the planetary subsurface, or in the planetary 
atmosphere. 
3. Quarantine (of an extraterrestrial planet). Quaran- 
tine is defined as a requirement to avoid infection 
prior to a specified calendar year or for a specified pe- 
riod of time. 
The planetary quarantine requirements established by 
the Voyager Project Office for the Voyager 1973 Mission 
are typically as follows: the total probability of violation 
of the quarantine of the planet Mars as a result of the 
dual launch of the Voyager 1973 Mission shall be less 
than approximately In addition, the quarantine 
period has been set at 20 yr, so that the quarantine will 
not end prior to the calendar year 1985 A.D. These ex- 
plicit requirements result from considerations which are 
outside the scope of this document; but see Ref. 1 and 2. 
C. Planetary Quarantine Policy 
In order to ensure adherence to the planetary quaran- 
tine requirements described in Subsection B, the Vogager 
Project has adopted the following policy for the 1973 
Mission to the planet Mars: 
1. All aspects of a proposed mission, including the 
complex interactions of the spacecraft with the in- 
terplanetary environment, shall be examined in 
order to isolate every conceivable source of plane- 
tary contamination. 
2. Each separate source of contamination shall be 
investigated to yield an adequate understanding of 
the processes through which it occurs, and, wher- 
ever possible, mathematical models shall be formu- 
lated which adequately characterize the probability 
of violation of quarantine. These mathematical 
models shall be based upon standard probabilistic 
techniques, conservative assumptions shall be em- 
ployed whenever uncertainties are present in the 
derivation of the probability formulae, and the limi- 
tations and assumptions inherent in their formula- 
tion shall be explicitly described in the explanations 
of their validity. Whenever an adequate mathemati- 
cal model is impossible (for example, when the 
necessary assumptions are not meaningful), every 
effort shall still be exerted to describe suitable 
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ranges or bounds for the probability of violation of 
quarantine. 
3. The total probability of violation of planctary quar- 
antine shall be constrained to satisfy the planetary 
quarantine requirements by the allocation of proba- 
bilities to the above modes of violation. 
4. Wherever possible, numerical estimates of the prob- 
abilities of violation of quarantioe by the above 
modes shall be calculated; and the space vehicle 
. shall be designed and constructed and the mission 
operations formulated such that these estimates 
conform to the allocated probability constraints. 
For those modes of violation of quarantine which 
cannot be adequately described by a mathematical 
model, the allocated probability constraints shall be 
employed as guidelines for the necessary engineer- 
ing and scientific judgements. 
5. All investigations of possible contamination sources 
and all numerical estimates of the probabilities of 
violation of quarantine shall be adequately docu- 
mented. 
I l l .  Planetary Quarantine Model and Probability 
Allocations 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, the limi- 
tations and assumptions inherent in the application of 
probability theory to the planetary quarantine problem 
must be understood, and are discussed below. Second, 
all identified possible modes of violation of the planetary 
quarantine are presented. 
Figures 1-5 diagram the Voyager 1973 Mission plane- 
tary quarantine model, and show (or can show) the 
following: 
1. All identified possible modes of violation of quar- 
2. The limiting probabilities of violation allocated to 
each mode by the Voyager Planetary Quarantine 
Office. 
3. The contribution and relationship of each mode 
to the over-all probability of violation of planetary 
quarantine. 
The model is also presented in an outline format in the 
Appendix. 
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B. The Validity of the Mathematical Model 
Several valid objections are applicable to any attempt 
to precisely formulate a mathematical model to ensure 
that the planetary quarantine requirements are met. The 
principal difficulty arises from the extremely small value 
of the limiting probability of violation of quarantine. 
Many of the contributing quantities are statistical in 
nature, and the applicability of the usually assumed 
probability distributions may be questionable at large 
variances. Strictly valid formulations would become in- 
volved with confidence levels on the variances of the 
actual distributions and would become extremely com- 
plex. Furthermore, even if confidence levels could be 
meaningfully incorporated into a usable model, empirical 
testing necessary to establish reasonable confidence 
levels at the extremely small probabilities involved would 
be hopelessly long-and costly. Finally, a case could be 
made for the argument that the probability of over- 
looking a significant mode of violating the planetary 
quarantine exceeds the extremely small allocations for 
contingency. All of these objections are quite valid to the 
extent that a mathematical model is incapable of prooing 
that the requirements have been satisfied. The objec- 
tiohs, however, should not preclude a rational attempt 
to meet the planetary quarantine requirements insofar as 
is possible and feasible. 
The fact that the limiting probability of violation of 
quarantine is so small does bear one benefit, in that 
the probability equations are simplified: Assume 
n independent sources of violation of quarantine. Define 
p j  to be the probability of violation by the ith mode. (Then 
0 5 p j  5 1, and i = 1, , n.) Then, the probability 
that quarantine will not be violated by the jth mode is 
(1 - P j ) .  
Now, the probability that the quarantine will be main- 
tained is the product of the individual probabilities. 
Further, the planetary quarantine requirement is that 
this probability be greater than or equal to (1 - Q), 
where Q is the limiting probability of violation of quar- 
antine. Thus, 
Now, since Q is very small, the individual p j  must be 
very small, so that on expansion of the product, the 
term; involving products of the p, will be .negligible. 
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Therefore, equation (1) may be rewritten as follows: 
Thus, we see from Eq. (2) that the sum of the individual 
probabilities of violating the quarantine over all the 
various modes of violation must be less than or equal to 
the limiting probability of viol a t’ ion. 
C. The Planetary Quarantine Model 
The acceptable overall probability of violating the 
quarantine of the planet Mars on a single mission has 
been established as an extremely small number (on the 
order of IO-’), for the reasons discussed in Subsection A. 
As a result, a very large number of unlikely modes of 
quarantine violation must be considered in any attempt 
to ensure that the actual probability will be below the 
established limit. 
An equation to express the estimated violation proba- 
bility would not only be unwieldy, but confusing and 
unclear, unless a departure from the usual format for 
equations is used. Furthermore, the various modes of 
quarantine violation can be considered at several levels 
of detail. To illustrate both of these points, consider the 
following: 
where 
Q = overall probability of violating the planetary 
quarantine of the planet Mars as a result of 
the Voyager 1973 Mission. 
pLv = probability of violating the planetary quaran- 
tine of the planet Mars as a result of all viola- 
tion modes associated with the launch vehicle. 
ppvl = violation probability resulting from all modes 
associated with planetary vehicle 1. 
ppvz  = violation probability resulting from all modes 
associated with planetary vehicle 2. 
But, each term on the right in Eq. (3) requires further 
expansion. For example, - 
P P V l  = PI + Pz i- Po (4) 
where 
p1 = 
p2 = 
p3 = 
the Voyager 1973 Mission (as modeled from a quaran- 
tine point of view). 
violation probability resulting from an intact 
hide 1. 
violation probability resulting from an orbiting 
spacecraft from planetary vehicle 1. 
violation probability resulting from a separated 
entry capsule from planetary vehicle 1. 
(spacecraft/capsule not separated) planetary The model which makes up the bulk of this document 
is not the only one which can be constructed. I t  is in- 
tended to provide an illustration of the complexity of the 
planetary quarantine problem, and to delineate most of 
the elements which must be considered. A number of the 
items in the model represent a great deal of analytical 
effort.’ 
Again, each term in Eq. (4) requires further expan- 
sion, but such expansion will not be illustrated at this 
point in the discussion. 
Two alternative formats for the presentation of the 
equation for the assessment of the overall violation prob- 
ability are presented in Fig. 1-5, and in the outline in 
the Appendix. It should be noted that both formats can 
be used for assessment (by starting at the bottom and 
working up) and for allocation (by starting at the top 
and working down). Both formats present the same 
probability equation and may be used in conjunction 
with each other. Submodels for maiiy of the key factors 
have yet to be established before an adequate assess- 
ment can be made; further breakdown of any of the 
lowest level entries is, of course, possible. 
The probabilities allocated to various possible modes 
of violation of quarantine are shown by the abbreviation ’ 
ALLOC = . Estimated values of various relevant param- 
eters are shown by the abbreviation EST=. Certai:: I;&- 
abilities have been conservatively assumed to be unity and 
are indicated by the abbreviation ASSUME = 1.0. In the 
figures and in the outline, the computational relation- 
ships of the various parameters are represented by signs 
for equality, acldition, and multiplication. 
The process of treating the quarantine model in suc- 
cessively more explicit detail is handled in the outline 
format (the Appendix) by indentation, and in Fig. 1-5 
by branchipg to successive levels. 
At the lowest levels shown, kill processes are generally 
treated as independent, while in fact the processes may 
combine to give higher kill probabilities than implied. 
This simplification is a conservative one, and therefore 
permitted. It may be desirable in some cases to be more 
precise by using joint kill probabilities or joint proba- 
bility distributions instead. In some cases, the relation- 
ships shown are oversimplified in another way. That is, 
some of the parameters of particular elements undergo 
wide variation during the course of the mission.* In such 
cases, the required probabilities can be conservatively 
estimated, or the addition relationships can be consid- 
ered as generalized sums (integrals or summations), and 
the product relationships considered as factors in the 
integrand. 
. Kill probabilities, for example, may not be indepen- 
dent of the number of microorganisms to be operated 
upon. This complication can be treated by use of probabil- 
ity distributions rather than point estimates of proba- 
bilities as is done here. This elaboration of the analysis 
can be applied to individual branches of the tree, if 
desired. 
Finally, it should be noted that there may be cases - 
particularly when simpler missions, such as fly-by mis- 
sions, are considered-in which it is unnecessary to 
evaluate all of the elements of the model in order to esti- 
mate or to allocate violation probabilities. It may be 
quite reasonable to simply note that some branches have 
a negligible contribution to the overall probability of 
violation of q~arant ine.~ 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This document presents a discussion of the need for 
the establishment of a quarantine of the planet Mars, a 
description of the current JPL planetary quarantine pol- 
icy and requirements, and a description of a model of 
‘For example, the fraction of orbiting spacecraft orbit trim rocket 
exhaust gases which reach Mars prior to 1985. 
’For example, the probability that planetary vehicle attitude con- 
trol gases ejected during transit will reach Mars prior to 1985. 
‘A branch has a “negligible contribution” if its estimated proba- 
hility is less than an allocation so small as to not materially affect 
the allocations to other branches at the same level. 
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Appendix 
Outline Format for the Model of t h e  Probability of Violation of 
the Quarant ine  of the  Planet Mars  as a Result 
of t h e  Voyager 1973 Mission 
Basic planetary quarantine requirement: The probability of violation of the 
quarantine of the planet Mars as a result of the Vogager 1973 Mission shall be 
less than or equal to Q'. This probability equals (=) 
I. Violation probability resulting from all violation modes associated with 
the Satzcrn V launch vehicle (ALLOC5= ; ESTG= 1 
+ 11. Violation probability resulting from all violation modes associated with 
planetary vehicle No. 1 (PV 1) (ALLOC= ; EST=- 1 
. +III. Violation probability resulting from all violation modes associated with 
planetary vehicle No. 2 (PV 2) (ALLOC= ; EST= 1 
1. Violation probability resulting from all violation modes associated with X232 Probability that any of the debris from an explosion of 
the S-IC stage contains at least one viable terrestrial the Saturn V launch vehicle 
ALLOC = ; EST=- organism and impacts Mars 
, = 1  
+2 
=21 
+ 22 
=221 
x 222 
+ 23 
5231 
Violation probability resulting from all violation modes as- 
sociated with the launch vehicle not identified below 
Contingency ALLOC=-; EST=O.O 
Violation modes associated with the Saturn I C  (S-IC) stage 
ALlOC=-; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with the S-IC stage not iden- 
tif ied below 
Contingency ALLOC=-; EST=0.0 
Probability of violation due to impact of S-IC stage 
ALLOC=--; EST=- 
Probability of Martian impact of S-IC stage 
ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Probability that at least one viable terrestrial organism is  
on or within the S-IC stage at Martian impact, given 
that malfunctions occur in  such a way that the S-IC 
stage impacts Mars 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to Martian impact of  a piece 
(or pieces) of the S-IC stage 
ALLOC=-.-; EST=- 
Probability that the S-IC stage explodes for any reason 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
'A numerical value yet to be established. 
'Allocated value 
'Estimated value. 
+ 24 
=241 
+ 242 
+ 243 
+ 244 
+ 245 
+ 246 
4- 247 
ALLOC = --; EST = 
Violation modes associated with the ejecta from the S-IC 
stage 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with other types of ejecta from 
the S-IC stage than identified below 
Contingency ALLOC =-; EST=0.0 
Probability of  viplation due to S-IC rocket exhaust 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of violation due to propellant leaked from the 
~ ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of violation due to $-IC stage thrust vector 
control (NC) f luid 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
S-IC tanks 
Probability of violation due to S-IC stage attitude control 
ea' 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability of violation due to loose hardware associated 
with the S-IC stage 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability of  violation due to shrapnel from S-IC stage 
pyrotechnics 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
4-248 Probability of violation due to material outgassed, spalled, 
ablated, or sputtered from the SIC stage 
ALLOC=-; EST= - . 
1 P l  TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 33-252 9 
25 (%) 
30 ('h) 
+ -  
251 
301 
- <- 
252 + -  
302 
+3 
=31 
+ 32 
=321 
X 322 
+ 33 
2 3 3 1  
X 332 
+ 34 
=341 
4-342 
+ 343 
+ 344 
+ 345 
I 10 
Violation modes associated with the Saturn IC/Saturn / I  
(S-lC/S-ll) stage separation 
ALLOC=-, half charged to S-IC stage, half 
to S-ll stage; EST= 
Probability that contaminated loose hardware resulting from 
an assumed S-IC/S-I1 separation will impact Mars 
ALLOC =-; EST=- 
Probability that contaminated pyrotechnic shrapnel result. 
ing from an assumed S-IC/S-lI separation will impact 
Mars 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with the S-11 sfage 
ALLOC=--; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with the S-II stage not iden- 
tified below 
Contingency ALLOC=-; E S T z O . 0  
Probability of violation due to impact of S-I1 stage 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability of Martian impact of S-ll stage 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability that at least one viable terrestrial organism i s  
on or within the S-11 stage at Martian impact, given 
that malfunctions occur in such a way that the S-It 
stage impacts Mars 
ASSUME= 1.0 
Probability o f  violation due to Martian impact of a piece 
(or pieces) of the S-ll stage 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability that the S l l  stage explodes for any reason 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability that any of the debris from an explosion of 
the Sll stage contains at least one viable terrestrial 
organism and impacts Mars 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with the ejecta from the S-ll 
stage 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Violation modes associated with other types of ejecta from 
tho S-ll stage than identified below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; EST=O.O 
Probability of violation due to S-ll rocket exhaust 
ALLOC= ; €ST= 
Probability of violation due to propellant leaked from the 
S-ll tanks 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of violation due to Sll stage TVC fluid 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability o f  violation due to SI1 stage attitude control 
ALLOC= : EST= 
+346 
+ 347 
+34a 
35 (%) 
40 (%) 
+ -  
351 
401 
- <- 
352 + -  
402 
+4  
=41 
4- 42 
=42) 
=4211 
X4212 
X 422 
+ 43 
5 4 3 1  
X 432 
+44 
Probability of violation due to loose hardware associated 
with the S-ll stage 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability of violation due to shrapnel from S-ll sfage 
pyrotechnics 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability of violation due to material outgassed, spalled, 
ablated, or sputtered from the S-ll stase 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with the Saturn ///Saturn IVB 
, half charged to  S-Il stage, half 
(S-II/S-IVB) stage separation 
ALLOC = 
to S-IVR stage; EST= 
Probability that contaminated loose hardware resulting 
from an assumed S-lI/S-IVB separation wil l  impact 
Mars 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability that contaminated pyrotechnic shrapnel result- 
ing from an assumed S-II/S-IVB separation will im- 
pact Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Violation modes associated with the S-IVB stage 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Violation modes associated with the S-IVB stage not iden- 
tified below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; EST=O.O 
Probability o f  violation due to impact of S-IVB stage 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability of Martian impact of S-IVB stage 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability S-IVB stage i s  on a Martian impact trajectory 
after both planetary vehicle separations 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability S-IVB retrorockets (if any) do not remove the 
S-IVB from an impact trajectory 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability that at least one viable terrestrial organism 
is on or  within the S-IVB stage at Martian impact, 
given that the S-IVB stage impacts Mars 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to Martian impact of a piece 
(or pieces) of the S-IVB stage 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of explosion of  S-1VB stage for any reason 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability that any of the debris from an explosion of 
the SlVB stage contains at least one viable terres- 
trial organism and impacts Mars 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Violation modes associated with the ejecta from 
stage 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
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=441 
+442 
+443 
+w 
+445 
+446 
+447 
+ 448 
+5 
=51 
+ 52 
=521 
x 522 
+ 53 
3 5 3 1  
x 532 
Violation modes associated with other types of ejecta from 
the S-IVB rtage than identified below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; ESTzO.0  
Probability of violation due to S-IVB rocket exhaust 
ALLOC=--; EST= 
Probability of  violation due to propellant leaked from 
. the S-IVB tanks 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability of violation due to S-IVB rtage N C  f lu id 
ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Probability of  violation due to S-IVB attitude control gas 
ALLOC = : EST= 
Probability of  violation due to loose hardware associated 
with the S-IVB stage 
A L L O C = -  EST= 
Probability of  violation due to rhrapnel from S-IVB 
pfiotechnicr 
ALLOC=;; EST= 
Probability o f  violation due to material outgassed, spalled, 
ablated, sputtered, etc., from the S-IVB rtage 
ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with the aerodynamic nose 
fairing (shroud) 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Violation modes associated with the rhroud not identified 
below 
Contingency ALLOC = ; EST=O.O 
Probability of  violation due to  loose hardware associated 
with the shroud 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability that loose hardware associated with the rhroud 
wi l l  impact Marr 
ALLOC = EST= 
Probability that at least one viable terrestrial organism i s  
o n  o r  within loose hardware associated with the 
shroud, given that ruch hardware impacts Marr 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to Martian impact o f  a piece 
(or pieces) of the rhroud 
ALLOC=.-; EST= 
Probability that any rhroud pieces impact M a n  
ALLOC=-; EST= 
It. Violation probability resulting from all violation modes associated with 
planetary vehicle No. 1 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
=l Violation probability resulting from ell modes associated 
with PV 1 not identified below 
Contingency ALLOC=,--; EST=O.O 
+2  Violation modes associated with en intact planetary 
vehicle 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
=21 Violation modes associated with an intact planetary ve- 
hicle not identified below 
Contingency ALLOC=-; ESTz0.0  
+22 Probability of violation due to impact of  the intact plane- 
tary vehicle 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
~ 2 2 1  Probability of  violation due to impact resulting from 
. causes other than those identified below 
Contingency ALLOC=- EST=O.O 
+ 222 
E2221 
. x2222 
X 2223 
X 2224 
4-223 
4-224 
+225 
4-226 
Probability of violation due to PV being placed on an 
impact trajectory at injection 
ALLOC=p* EST= 
Probability midcourse engine fails to deliver sufficient 
control and/or thrust to produce abort (;.e., to re- 
move PV from impact trajectory) 
ALLOC=- - EST= 
Probability retro (orbit insertion) engine fails to produce 
.bot'! 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability PV i s  contaminated when at Marr 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability PV i s  placed on impact trajectory at injection 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability of violation due to PV being placed on an 
impact trajectory by a midcourse maneuver 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
- I  
Probability of  violation due to PV impact rerulting from 
orbit inaertion attempt 
ALLOC = ; EST- 
Probability of  violation due to PV impact resulting from 
orbit trim attempts 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability of  violation due to  orbital decay of  intact 
planetary vehicle 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
~ 2 2 6 1  Probability PV orbit decays prior to 1985 
ALLOC=-j EST= 
X2262 Probability capsule not separated 
ALLOC=-; EST= Probability that at least one viable terrestrial organism i s  
on or within the shroud piece (or pieces) which im 
pact Man, given that such impact occurr X2263 Probability PV contaminated at the time of  orbit d a y  
ASSUME = 1 .O ASSUME = 1 .O - 
* .  
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3 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
1 
I 
I 
8 
I 
I 
I 
+ 23 
=231 
X 232 
+ 24 
=241 
=2411 
+2412 
=24121 
X 241 22 
= 241 22 1 
X241222 
X241223 
X241224 
X 241 225 
X 241 226 
X 241 227 
X241228 
+2413 
12 . 
Probability of violation due to  impact of PV explosion 
rhrapnel 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability PV explodes 
ALLOC=-, - EST= 
Probability !ha+ a contaminated piece of an exploded PV 
will impact Mars 
ALLOC =- - EST= 
Violation modes associated with ejecfa from PV 1 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Violation modes associated with ejecta released from 
PV 1 prior to orbit achievement 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Violation modes associated with other types of  ejecta from 
PV 1 than identified below 
Contingency ALLOC=-; EST=O.O 
Probability of  violation due to midcourse maneuver ex- 
haust gases 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Fraction of such gases which will reach Mars prior to 
1985 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability such gases are contaminated when they reach 
M a n  
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Initial microbial load of  such propellants 
ALLOC=-: EST= 
Probability initially viable microorganisms in the propel- 
lants are not killed by the propellants 
ALLOC =-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms are not killed in 
the ejection process 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probabi!ity remaining microorganisms are not killed by 
other rneanr 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms do not "die off" 
(due to time, lack of food, oh.) 
ALLOC =- . EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms are not killed by 
UV radiation 
ALLOC=-j EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms are not killed by 
other rolar radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms are not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
probability of  violation due to anitude control gads  
ALLOC=.-; EST= 
.. 
=24131 
X24132 
=241321 
X241322 
X241323 
X 241324 
X241325 
X241326 
X241327 
+2414 
=24141 
X24142'. 
X24143 
X24144 
X24145 
X24146 
X24147 
X24148 
Fraction of transit attitude control gases which wil l reach 
Mars prior to 1985 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability such gases are contaminated when they reach 
Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Initial microbial load of such gases 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability microorganisms not killed by  other means 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by ejec- 
tion process 
ALLOC = ; EST- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by "die 
off" 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  UV 
radiation 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  other 
rolar radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to outgassed, rpalled, ab- 
lated, sputtered, or other material 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Fraction of ,such material which wi l l  reach Mars prior to 
2023 
ALLOC =- * EST= 
initial microbial load of such material 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability microorganisms not killed by other means 
ALLOC = ; EST= * I  
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  ejec- 
tion process 
~ U O C  = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  "die 
' off" 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
' ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
. aolar radiation 
radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST=. 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME= 1.0 
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+ 242 
+ 243 
=2431 
+ 2432 
=24321 
X24322 
=243221 
X243222 
X243223 
X 243224 
X 243225 
X 243226 
X243227 
+ 2433 
=24331 
X 24332 
~ 2 4 3 3 2 1  
Violation modes associated with ejecta released from PV 1 
during orbit insertion 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with ejecta released from PV 1 
after orbit insertion 
ALLOC = ; €ST= 
Violation modes associated with other types of ejecta from 
PV 1 than identified below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; E S T z O . 0  
Probability of violation due to  orbit trim rocket exhaust 
gases 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Fraction of such gases which will reach Mars prior to 
1985 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability such gases are contaminated when they reach 
Mars 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Initial microbial load of retro propellants 
ALLOC=--; EST=- 
Probability microorganisms are not killed by propellants 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by ajec- 
tion process 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
- means 
ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Probibility remaining microorganisms not killed by "die 
off" 
ALLOC = : EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC=.-; EST=- 
Prob'ability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to attitude control gas from 
PV 1 
ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Fraction of such gases will reach Mars prior to 1985 
ALLOC = * EST= 
Probability attitude control gases contaminated when at 
Man 
ALLOC=.-; EST=- 
Probability such gas- contaminated initially 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
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X 243322 
X 243323 
X245324 
X 243325 
X243326 
X 243327 
+ 2434 
=24341 
X 24342 
e243421 
X 243422 
X243423 
X 243424 
X243425 
X 243426 
X 243427 
X 24343 
+ 25 
Probability microorganisms not killed by other means 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by "die 
off" 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by ejec- 
tion process 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probabilily of violation due  to outgassed. spalIed, ab- 
lated, sputtered, etc., material 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Expected microbial load of such material ejected prior to 
rpacecraft/capsule separation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
. I  
Probability such material is contaminated when it reaches 
Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability such material i s  contaminated initially 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability microorganisms not killed by other means 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by eiec- 
tion process 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by "die 
- I off'# 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Fraction of such material which reaches Mars prior to 
1985 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability of violation due  to impad to the fomard part 
- of the biological barrier 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
13 
=251 
X 252 
4- 26 
=261 
4-262 
+3 
=31 
+ 32 
=321 
X 322 
= 322 1 
+ 3222 
+ 3223 
+ 3224 
4-3225 
+3226 
+ 33 
=331 
~ 3 3 1 1  
=33111 
+33! 12 
14 
Probability of impact of the forward part of the biological 
barrier 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability forward part of biological barrier contaminated 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Viplation modes associated with Launch Vehicle/Planetary 
Vehicle 1 separation 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Violation due to impact of contaminated loose hardware 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Violation due  to impact of contaminated pyrotechnic 
shrapnel 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Violation modes associated with the orbiting spacecraft 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Violation modes associated with an orbiting spacecraft not 
identified below 
CoAtingency ALLOC= ; EST=O.O 
Violation due to premature impact of the orbiting rpace- 
crah 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability orbiting spacecraft contaminated a t  impact 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability orbiting spacecraft impacts prior to 1985 
ALLOC = -. EST= 
Probability of premature orbit decay as a result of other 
causes than shown below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Probability of premature decay due to atmospheric drag 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability of impact due to faulty orbit trim maneuvers 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of impact due to perturbations a t  spacecraft/ 
capsule separation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability of decay due to N-body gravitational per- 
turbations 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability of decay due to gravitational harmonics 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Violation due to impact of Spacecraft pieces prior to 1985 
ALLOC=.-; EST= 
Probability spacecraft breaks into pieces 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability spacecraft explodes 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability of any other explosion on the orbiting 8paCO- 
craft 
Contingency ALLOC=- E S T 5 0 . 0  
Probability midcoune motor explodes 
ALLOC = : EST= 
4-33113 
-I-33114 
+33115 
4-33116 
4-3312 
=33121 
X33122 
+3313 
=33131 
X33132 
X 332 
x 333 
=3331 
X 3332 
x 3333 
x 3334 
x3335 
X 3336 
x 3337 
+ 34 
Probability orbit insertion motor ex1 es 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability orbit trim motor explodes 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability pressure tanks explode 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability batteries explode 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability spacecraft smashed by meteorites 
ALLOC=--; EST= 
Probability a sufficiently large meteorite hits the space- 
craft prior to 1985 
ALLOC=.p* EST= 
Probability that any of the resultant pieces impact Mars 
prior to 1985 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability spacecraft breaks up from centrifugal force 
prior to 1985 , 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability attitude control system fails prior to 1985 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability unbalanced forces cause excessive spacecraft 
spin-up prior to 1985 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability any spacecraft pieces decay prior to 1985 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability any spacecraft pieces which decay prior to 
1985 are Contaminated when at Man 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Initial spacecraft microbial load 
ALLOC = -  EST = - 
Probability microorganisms not killed by other means 
ALLOC = ; EST= . .  
Probability microorganisms not killed by entry 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Fraction of initial load leh when spacecraft breaks up 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
- wlar radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
VbCUUm 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Violation modes associated with ejecta from an orbiting 
spacecraft 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
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=341 
+ 342 
=3421 
X 3422 
X 3423 
=34231 
X 34232 
X 34233 
X 34234 
X 34235 
X 34236 
X 34237 
+ 343 
=343l  
X 3432 
x 3433 
=34331 
X 34332 
Violation modes associated with other types of ejecta from I 
orbiting spacecraft than identified below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; EST=O.O 
Probability of violation due to orbit trim rocket exhaust 
gases 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability orbit trim rocket propellants contaminated 
initially 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Fraction of such gases which reach Mars prior to m- 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability microorganisms not killed prior to Mars entry 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability microorganisms not killed by other means 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by pro. 
pellants 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed during 
rocket firing 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by "die 
off" 
ALLOC= ; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to attitude control gases 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability attitude control gas contains viable terrestrial 
microorganisms initially (or initial microbial load) 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Fraction of attitude control gas which reaches Mars prior 
to 2023 
ALLOC=:-; EST= 
Probability microorganirms not killed in transit to Mars 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganirms not killed by means 
other than identified below 
ALLOC=:-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed during 
release 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
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x34333 
x 34334 
x34335 
X 34'336 
+ 344 
=3441 
X 3442 
=34421 
X 34422 
=344221 
X 344222 
X 344223 
X 344224 
X344225 
X 34423 
=344231 
X 344232 
X 344233 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by "die 
off" 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV . 
radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of violation due to material outgassed, spalled, 
etc. 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Fraction of such material which impacts Mars prior to 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability such material contaminated when at Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Initial microbial load of such material 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability viable microorganisms not killed i n  transit 
prior to ejection 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability microorganisms not killed by means other 
than as follows 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  "die 
off" in transit 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining m;croorganismr nn! ki!!ed by L'V 
radiation 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  other 
solar radiation 
I ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability viable microorganisms not killed during or 
after ejection from spacecraft 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining organisms not killed by  means other 
than as follows 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by  "die 
off" 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by eiec- 
tion process 
ALLOC= ; EST= 
15 
t 
I 
i 
X 344234 
X 344235 
X344236 
+ 35 
=351 
X 352 
+4 
=41 
+42 
+ 43 
=431 
X 432 
+ 44 
=441 
x 442 
=4421 
+ 4422 
= 4422 1 
4-44222 
16 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Violation due to impact of the aft part of the biological 
barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability aft part of biological-barrier impacts Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability aft part of biological barrier is  contaminated 
when it impacts Mars 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Violation modes associated with a separated entry capsule 
ALLOC =-; EST= 
Violation modes associated with a separated entry capsule 
riot identified below 
Continyency ALLOC =-; EST=O.O 
Probability contaminated spacecraft/capsule separation de- 
bris impacts Mars prior to 1985 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with capsule ejecta 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Fraction of capsule ejecta which impacts Mars 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
P:=bability capsule ejecta is contaminated when it reacher 
Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Violation modes associated with impact or landing of an 
entry capsule 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability of capsule contacting Mars 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of capsule being contaminated when contact- 
ing Mars 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability of iai lure of heat sterilization 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability of recontamination occurring and remaining 
undiscovered prior to  launch 
ALLOC = ; EST=- 
Probability of undiscovered recontamination due to  poor 
handling 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability of failure of "sterile insertion" fechniques (if 
used) 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
+ 4423 
= 4423 1 
+ 44232 
= 44232 1 
X 442322 
X442323 
=4423231 
+4423232 
4-44233 
=442331 
X 442332 
4- 44234 
=442341 
X 442342 
X 442343 
+ 4424 
=44241 
= 4424 1 1' 
Probability of recontamination due to  failure of biological 
barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Recontamination due to modes of biological barrier failure 
other than shown below 
Contingency ALLOC= ; EST=O.O 
Recontamination due to structural failure of biological 
barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability biological barrier structure fails 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability capsule recontaminated if the biological bar- 
rier structure fails 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability mission not aborted i f  there is structural fail- 
ure o f  the biological barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability structural failure of biological barrier i s  not 
detected 
ALLOC=--; EST= 
Probability failure i s  detected and mission is still not 
aborted 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of recontamination due to bad biological seals 
on the biological barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of biological barrier having bad seals 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability capsule recontaminated if bad seals are present 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of recontamination due to micrometeoric punc- 
ture of biological barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probable number of micrometeoric punctures 
'ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability that a viable terrestrial microorganism enters 
puncture hole i n  the biological barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability that such organisms would travel from the 
biological barrier to the capsule 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability of recontamination of the entry capsule after 
the removal of the biological barrier 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
. 
Probability that particles surrounding the planetary ve- 
hicle are not sterile 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Number of particles surrounding planetary vehicle which 
are not sterile initially 
ALLOC=p; EST=- 
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I 
m 
u 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
X442412 
= 44241 21 
X 4424122 
X 44241 23 
X4424124 
X 4424125 
Probability microorganisms on such particles are not killed 
i n  fligh? 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability microorganisms not killed by other means than 
shown below 
ALLOC=-; EST=- 
Probability remaining microorganisms no? killed by ”die 
off” 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability microorganisms not killed when dislodged 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by UV 
radiation 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
Probability remaining microorganisms no? killed by other 
solar radiation 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
X 4424 126 
X44242 
= 44242 1 
X 442422 
Probability remaining microorganisms not killed by 
vacuum 
ASSUME = 1 .O 
Probability of unsterile particles contaminating capsule 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability unsterile particles impinge on capsule 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
Probability impinging unsterile particles stick to the capsule 
ALLOC = ; EST= 
111. Violation probability resulting from all violation modes associated with 
planetary vehicle No. 2 
ALLOC=-; EST= 
This submodel probability is  similar to that for planetary vehicle No. 1, 
detailed in preceding Subsection II. 
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